تبیین فلسفی مسئولیت اخلاقی از دیدگاه جان مارتین فیشر
محورهای موضوعی : اخلاق و تربیت اسلامی
کلید واژه: مسئولیت اخلاقی, کنترل هدایتگر, جبرگرایی علّی, جان مارتین فیشر ,
چکیده مقاله :
یکی از شرط‌های مطرح شده در باره مسئولیت اخلاقی، شرط کنترل است. تلقی رایج، مفهوم کنترل را بر اساس دسترسی عامل به امکان‌های بدیل تفسیر کرده امّا جبرگرایی علّی با ارائه ادله‌ای از جمله دلیل پیامد، این تلقی را با چالش‌های جدّی روبرو کرده است. جان مارتین فیشر تمایل دارد چالش جبرگرایی علّی، به‌خصوص نتیجه‌ی برهان پیامد، را بپذیرد. لذا با توجّه به آن، در مفهوم کنترل بازنگری می‌کند. فیشر نظریه‌ی خود در باب مسئولیت اخلاقی را بر مبنای مفهوم «کنترل هدایتگر» (در تمایز از کنترل نظارتی) توضیح می‌دهد. این نوع کنترل، دو مؤلفه‌ی اساسی و هر یک از آن‌ها سه ملاک برای تشخیص دارد. فیشر از این عناصر در چهار جهت استفاده‌ی نظری می‌کند: 1) بازشناسی مسئولیت اخلاقی در موقعیت‌های مختلف عملی؛ 2) توضیح و دفاع از انواع سه‌گانه‌ی مسئولیت اخلاقی؛ 3) پاسخگویی به نقدها و چالش‌ها؛ 4) بسط و توسعه‌ِی نظریه‌اش.
One of the conditions posed on the moral responsibility, it's a control. For the common consideration, it's interpreted the concept of a control based on the availability of an agent to the alternative possibilities, but causal determinism has faced this consideration up to the critical challenges. John Martin Fischer tend to agree with the challenge of causal determinism, particularly with the result of the consequence argument. Hence, he revises the concept of the control. Fischer clarifies his theory about the moral responsibility based on the concept of "guidance control", against regulative control. This type of the control has two main components that each of them has three criterion for determination. Fischer uses these elements in four aspects: 1) recognition of the moral responsibility in the practical different situations; 2) illumination and defense of the triad types of the moral responsibility; 3) responsiveness to the challenges and criticism; 4) development and explanation of his theory.
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