"Analysis and Criticism of Moral Doubt is Moderate Outfit "
Subject Areas : Ethics and Islamic Education
Keywords: academic skepticism, Pyrrhonism, modest skepticism, extreme skepticism, contrastivism ,
Abstract :
This article is aimed at explaining and criticizing Sinnott-Armstrong's stance about the justification of moral beliefs. Sinnott-Armstrong has formulated his stance making a compromise between three types of skepticism. That is if moral nihilism exists as an alternative in a contrast class and since assuming the negation of moral nihilism is begging the question and is impossible, skeptic arguments will work and it becomes impossible to answer. However, if moral nihilism is not an alternative in a contrast class, we can be modestly justified. But in an unqualified contrast class if it is not stipulated, since it is impossible to identify which contrast class –extreme or modest- is an appropriate one, we should keep silent about justified moral belief which leads to Pyrrhonism.
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